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Aristotle's definition of motion 
L. A. KOSMAN 
It 4T otion," says Aristotle, "is the actualization of what potentially 
is, as such - 'ro5 8uvu4a Ovroq E'vreXiXec, a 'rTOLi:irov."' If we 
are to believe Aristotle, this definition speaks to a problem 
which was perplexing and refractory to his predecessors, and it is 
itself complex and subtle, employing concepts which are, as he says, 
"difficult to grasp."2 Given the intricacy of many of Aristotle's tech- 
nical concepts, this claim might seem outrageous; for on the usual 
understanding, his definition of motion is straightforward and pellucid. 
I shall try to show that that understanding is wrong, and that Aristotle's 
definition is more subtle than it is usually taken to be. 
I 
"Actualization" is an inelegant and in many ways misleading rendering 
of ' I have used it because it incorporates an interesting 
ambiguity about which we must become clear. Like other terms used 
to translate "ev?reSXect," "actualization" may refer either to a process 
or to the result of a process. In one sense, the actualization of a man's 
hopes may be said to be taking place in the unfolding of some event; 
in another, it may be said to exist as a result of that event. When 
Aristotle says that motion is the actualization of the potential, in which 
sense is he using that term; does he mean a process or a product? 
There is an immediate temptation to suppose that he means the 
former. For he is defining motion, that is, the process by which the 
potential to be something or other is actualized. In any case of motion, 
it is obvious that the product is not this process, but its result. For 
example, in the building of a house, the product is not the act of build- 
ing or of being built,3 but the building, that is, the house itself, which 
1 Physics III, 2, 201 all. Similar versions are in the same chapter at 201 a29, 
201b5, 202a7 and at Physics VIII, 1, 251a9 and Metaphysics Kappa, 1, 
1065bl6, 1065b23. As so often in Aristotle, "is" is here used as a predicate 
variable; read "of what potentially is so-and-so . . ". 
2 Physics III, 1, 202 al. 
3 Like Aristotle, I have been indiscriminate in my use of building and of being 
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results from this act. So it is not in this sense that the actualization 
of bricks and stones qua potentially a house is said to be motion; it 
must therefore be actualization in the sense of process, the actualizing 
of bricks and stones qua potentially a house, which Aristotle defines 
as the motion of building. 
So Aristotle's definition has often been taken. W. D. Ross writes 
that for Aristotle "motion is 'the actualization of that which is potential- 
ly, as such.' I.e. if there is something which is actually x and potentially 
y, motion is the making actual of its y-ness."4 And in commenting 
directly upon Aristotle's central formulation of the definition, Ross 
is more explicit; "Z'vreXv xLa," he writes, "must here mean 'actualiz- 
ation', not 'actuality': it is the passage from potentiality to actuality 
that is X'LV74.5 
But this answer is wrong. I do not mean that Aristotle would have 
been unhappy with the description of motion as the actualizing of a 
potentiality, but only that this is not the definition which he offers at 
the beginning of Book III of the Physics. 
In the first place, the definition on this account becomes astonishing- 
ly vacuous. For to say that motion is the process of actualization by 
which a potentiality is actualized is to attempt to define motion in 
terms of the very concept in question, that of the process of actualiz- 
ation. The reason that the definition of motion is, as Aristotle com- 
plains, so difficult, is that it is unclear just what sort of thing a process 
of actualizing a potentiality is. Aristotle's definition might, on this 
account, be helpful in exhibiting important connections between 
motion and the potential-actual distinction, but it could be an il- 
luminating definition (if at all) only of one or both of these latter 
concepts; as a definition of motion, it is empty and uninformative.6 
There is a parry to this objection; for there is a broad sense of 
"actualization" in which not every actualization, according to 
built, though in a strict sense only being built should serve as an example. The 
reason for this will become clear. 
4 W. D. Ross, Aristotle, (Fifth Edition, London, 1949), 81. 
5 W. D. Ross, Aristotle's Physics, (Oxford, 1936), 537. One could multiply ex- 
ample's; Zeller, for instance, says that Aristotle means to define motion as 
"Verwirklichung... Thatigkeit... Bestimmtwerden... Uebergang...", Die 
Philosophie der Griechen, (Leipzig, 1921) II, 2, 351. 
6 Aquinas voices just such an objection, arguing that those who define motion 
as exitus de potentia in actum have committed a fallacy of definition, since exitus 
is itself a species of motion; Commentaria in Octo Libros Physicorum Aristotelis, 
Lib. III, Cap. I, Lec. II, n. 2. 
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Aristotle, is a motion. The actualization of a skill or disposition to act 
in a certain way, such as occurs, for example, when a wise man exercises 
and makes manifest his wisdom, is not.7 We might then understand 
Aristotle to be defining motion as one species of a broader genus of 
actualization, of which the actuialization of a disposition in its exercise 
is another. 
But this lacks force as a counter to the objection. Once again, it 
substitutes a true characterization of motion for the particular de- 
finition with which we are concerned. Nowhere in that definition are 
any differentiae offered which might serve to distinguish motion as 
such and such a kind of actualization distinct from that by which a 
disposition is actualized. 
There are, in any case, further and more serious objections to this 
account. For it to make sense, the term "E'wreX uxs " must signify a 
process and not a state or condition which might result from a process. 
There is a sense in which it would be correct, though dangerous, to 
say this of "ev6pyetoc". But although Aristotle elsewhere speaks of 
motion as a kind of 'vzpysca, he consistently employs the term "?vlr- 
?gxpixe" in versions of the definition of motion which we are considering.8 
And there is little question that in Aristotle's use, this term signifies a 
state of having arrived at completeness or perfection." 
But the most serious difficulty with this account is that it renders 
mysterious the crucial phrase in the definition " roto5ov - as such." 
For the actualization of a being qua anything at all, given the sense of 
"actualization" proposed, would be some sort of motion. There would 
then be no point to the inclusion of this phrase in the definition, where- 
as it is clear that Aristotle takes the phrase to be a crucial and im- 
portant part of the definition. Furthermore, if we take the phrase 
seriously, the definition as understood will not give us what we want. 
The actualization, for example, of bricks and stones qua potentially a 
house will not be the building of a house, but the process of bricks and 
stones becoming potentially a house. 
7On the Soul II, 5, 417blOff. Cf. below, 54 ff. 
8 The only exception is at Metaphysics Kappa, 9, 1065 b 16, where the excerpter 
who authored the latter part of Kappa has, as at line 18, replaced "IvreiXexLa" 
by "&vipyox". At Physics VIII, 1, 251a9, Ross follows Simplicius and reads 
"&vkpyeLav," but I see no reason to prefer this to the reading of "'Ivre)iXeLacv" 
found in the majority of the manuscripts and Themistius. But see George 
Blair's interesting study, "The Meaning of 'Energeia' and 'Entelecheia' in 
Aristotle," International Philosophical Quarterly, VII, 101 ff. 
9 Cf. Ross' note at 1074a30 in Aristotle's Metaphysics, (Oxford, 1953) II, 245. 
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There is, however, no process by which bricks and stones become 
potentially a house, unless it is that by which they become bricks and 
stones, and this is what Aristotle specifically rtules out when he says, 
in the passage following the definition, that it is not the actualization 
of bronze qua bronze which is motion.10 And even if there were such a 
process, we should not have the definition which Aristotle means to 
give. For the actualization of the buildable qua buildable would be the 
process bywhich the buildable becomes buildable, rather than, as Aristotle 
has in mind, building, i.e., the process by which the buildable becomes 
built. 
I think that these objections are fatal enough to the proposed ac- 
count to let us dispense with the uncomfortable courtesy of translating 
evre,E`Xem" or "`v`pyx" by "actualization" and use the much pre- 
ferable term "actuality." 
But what about our initial concern, namely that only a definition in 
terms of process would yield the motion rather than the result of the 
motion. The seriousness of this concern will become clear if we now turn 
to a second question: what is meant by that part of the definition 
which states that motion is the actuality of what potentially is, as 
such? What do the words "as such" add to the definition? These 
words seemed superfluous on the previous interpretation; given that 
they are not, just what is their force? 
A helpful beginning is to note that for anything which is potentially 
A, there is some B which at the same time that thing is actually. The 
bricks and stones which are potentially a house are actually bricks and 
stones. Now it is not the actuality of bricks and stones qua bricks and 
stones which is relevant to building a house, but their actuality qua 
potentially a house. So Aristotle says that motion is the actuality of 
something which is potentially, but not qua what that something is 
actually at the moment, but qua what it is potentially. 
When the matter is put this way, however, it is easy to feel the force 
of our concern that such an account will yield not the process of build- 
ing, but the physical building which is a result of that process. Ross 
shares this concern, and his solution is both ingenious and interesting. 
He writes: 
An aggregate of bricks, stones, &c., may be regarded (1) as so many bricks, 
stones, &c., (2) as potentially a house, (3) as potentially being in course of 
being fashioned into a house. The movement of building is the realization 
not (1) of the materials as these materials (they are, previously to the 
10 Physics III, 2, 201a30ff. 
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movement of building, already actually these materials), nor (2) of their 
potentiality of being a house (the house is the realization of this), but (3) 
of their potentiality of being fashioned into a house.11 
Ross clearly takes this to be an interpretation, not an emendation of 
Aristotle's theory, and looks for support to Aristotle's remarks at the 
end of the chapter in which motion is first defined. Aristotle there 
argues, by way of illustration, that 
the actuality [&vipyeLm] of the buildable qua buildable is building. For either 
building or the house is the actuality of the buildable; but when it is a house, 
it is no longer buildable, whereas what is built is the buildable.'" 
It is hard to believe, however, that this passage expresses what 
Ross takes it to express. For if so, motion will be defined as the 
actuality of a certain potential, namely the potential of being in 
motion. And it is surely a calumny to suggest that Aristotle might 
have considered this an instructive definition. It might serve as a 
definition or part of a definition of "actuality" and "potentiality": 
part of the list, for example, given in Metaphysics Theta, 6.13 But it 
could no more be an instructive definition of "motion" than "white is 
the actuality of what is potentially white qua potentially white" could 
be an instructive definition of "white". 
Secondly, the suggestion that the actuality to which Aristotle is 
referring is that of the object's potentiality to become rather than 
to be something else, of the potentiality of bricks and stones, for 
example, to be /ashioned into a house, simply finds no substantiation 
in the text. Not only does Aristotle nowhere suggest this as the poten- 
tiality he has in mind, he is explicit that it is something's potentiality 
to be and not to become something else in terms of which he means 
to define the motion by which it becomes that something else. In ex- 
plicating the phrase "as such," he distinguishes between bronze (a) 
qua potentially a statue and (b) qua bronze. When a number of lines 
later he concludes that "motion is the actuality of the potential qua 
potential,"''4 he is clearly referring back to (a) the bronze qua potential- 
11 Ross' commentary on the Physics, op.cit., 536, and also with slight changes, 
his commentary on the Metaphysics, op.cit. II, 327. The view is substantially 
that of Aquinas, Commentaria, loc.cit., especially nn. 3 and 5. 
" Physics III, 1, 201 b9ff. 
1J 1048a37ff. 
1 Physics III, 1, 201 b4f. 
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ly a statue, not qua potentially being made into a statue; that possibility 
is never mentioned. 
But if it is correct that the potentiality which Aristotle has in mind 
is that of the bronze to be a statue, or of the bricks and stones to be a 
house, the problem once again arises that the definition gives us the 
finished product, the statue or the house, rather than the process or 
motion in which the bronze is wrought or the house built. If, of course, 
we had followed Ross much earlier in taking the definiens to refer to a 
process, there would be no such problem. For it is only when we 
understand "actuality" in the sense of product that a definition in 
terms of bricks and stones qua potentially a house threatens to yield 
the house itself rather than the act of building. It was precisely for 
this reason that we ever felt tempted to understand the definiens as 
including reference to a process. 
All of this makes rather mysterious why Ross should have felt it 
necessary to identify the potentiality in question as e.g. that which 
bricks and stones have of being fashioned into a house. The mystery 
is heightened by the realization that the two views are not simply 
supererogatory; they are incompatible. For if we talk of actualization 
in the sense of process, the actualization of the potentiality of bricks 
and stones to be built into a house will not be the process of building, 
but the process of that process coming into being. It will be, in other 
words, the movement by which bricks and stones begin being built 
into a house: not the first stage of building a house, but the process 
by which that first stage begins. Aristotle, however, is adamant (and 
correct) in his view that there is no such process. As a counter to 
Parmenidean arguments and for internal reasons which we shall see, 
it is important for him to deny, as he does throughout Books V and VI 
of the Physics, that there is a period of time in which motion begins, 
and that something's beginning to undergo motion is itself a motion. 
We are faced, then, with two independent and unhappy accounts of 
Aristotle's definition of motion. On one account, Aristotle is under- 
stood to be defining motion as the actualization (process) of a poten- 
tiality into an actuality; on the other, he is understood to be defining 
motion as the actuality (product) of a potentiality to be in motion.'5 
15 Both of these definitions of motion were current among Aristotle's medieval 
commentators, some of whom took Aristotle to be stating that motus est exitus 
de potentia in actum, others of whom took him to be stating that motus est actus 
exeuntis de potentia in actum. On this subject, see Anneliese Maier, Zwischen 
Philosophie und Mechanik, (Rome, 1958) 3-57. 
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These accounts articulate theories of motion which are by no means con- 
tradictory, but as accounts of Aristotle's definition, they are in- 
compatible and embody complementary difficulties. 
Can we frame an alternative account of Aristotle's definition which 
can steer us between Scylla and Charybdis? Ross unwittingly gives an 
account so vide as to become trapped, bargelike, in both difficulties. 
We must construct an account more svelte which (1) recognizes that 
Aristotle's definition talks about the actuality of a potentiality. (2) 
recognizes that potentiality as a potentiality to be, e.g. the potentiality 
of bricks and stones to be a house, but (3) yields motion and not its 
result, i.e., the act of building and not the house which is its product. 
II 
I have spoken throughout of the actuality (and making actual) of a 
.potentiality, rather than of the subject of a potentiality. In his defi- 
nition of motion, Aristotle speaks only of the latter, but it is clear that 
he would allow the other mode of speech, which he sometimes uses. The 
function of "qua . . ." (Q) makes clear this fact. If I am told that over 
the summer my friend has improved considerably, a context or further 
statement would normally be needed to make clear in what respect, 
qua what, he had improved. And to be told that lie has improved e.g. 
qua stutterer, is to be told that he has improved his stutter, (not his 
chess openings, say, nior his manhood.) So to say that bricks and stones 
have been actualized qua potentially a house, is to say that their 
potentiality to be a house has been actualized (and not, say, their 
potentiality to be a statue.) 
The fact that the words "qua . . ." in the phrase "so-and so has been 
actualized qua . . ." specify the respect in which it has been actualized 
is of little help in understanding our definition. For "qua potential" 
is too general to serve any function other than to make clear that it is 
the actuality of bricks and stolnes qua potentially something else and 
not qua bricks and stones which is in question. It is clear, however, 
that in considering what it is to speak of the actuality of a being which 
is potentially cp qua potentially p, we may justifiably attend to the 
locution "the actuality of a potentiality to be p." 
But what does it mean to speak of the actuality of a potentiality 
to be y? What does such a phrase signify? The natural temptation is to 
answer: being p. But such an answer is what caused us trouble, for if it 
is correct, then Aristotle's definition seems to capture the product of a 
46 
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motion rather than the motion itself, the physical building and not the 
act of building. Is there some alternative? Could actualizing a potenti- 
ality mean something other than destroying the potentiality and re- 
placing it by its concomitant actuality? 
Consider my stuttering friend. If I am told that he has spent the 
summer improving his stutter, I should then normally expect him to 
speak more fluently, less haltingly, in short, with less of a stutter. 
This is the sort of fact which philosophers sometimes find strange. 
Improving something here turns out to be equivalent to destroying it. 
One is now moved to imagine other expectations. Suppose my friend 
is an actor working on a role which demands a noticeable and con- 
vincing stutter, or a secret agent, who must for some recondite reason 
exhibit a speech impediment, or a neurotic who cultivates wounds, 
infirmities, and defects. In any of these cases, my expectations upon 
hearing that he has been improving his stutter might be quite different; 
I might now expect a man who stutters not less, but more. 
There is nothing mysterious about these facts. They are instances 
of a general feature of what might be called privation or imperfection 
terms. When such terms are the objects of terms signifying improve- 
ments, perfections, fulfillments, etc., an ambiguity results as to whether 
talk of perfecting the imperfection signifies its attenuation or ampli- 
fication. Upon completing a fragment of a poem, for example, does 
one have a whole poem or a whole fragment? 
At one level, this is simply a linguistic ambiguity, and we can, if 
necessary, make clear within the language which sense we are in- 
tending. One way of doing this, which locates an uneasiness which 
might have been felt about my earlier example and to which I 
shall return in a moment, is the following. Since a stutter is imperfect 
speech, we might distinguish between the cases by saying in the one 
instance that my friend had improved his stutter qua speech, or 
that he (a stutterer) had improved himself qua speaker, and in the 
other that he had improved his stutter qua stutter, or himself qua 
stutterer. 
Behind all this is the fact, which Aristotle finds revealing and 
important, that all change is from something which, though numerical- 
ly one, may be considered either as the privation from which the change 
occurs, or as the subject which changes. Thus he points out that we 
can say either (1) that a man becomes educated, (2) that the uneduca- 
ted becomes educated, or (3) that an uneducated man becomes educa- 
ted, and so, he goes on to argue, what changes is 
47 
This content downloaded from 165.82.168.47 on Fri, 12 Apr 2013 13:40:38 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
numerically one, but not formally one, that is, it can be described in dif- 
ferent ways. For it is not the same thing to be a man and to be educated, 
and the one endures, while the other does not; what is not an opposite 
endures (for the man endures), but the not educated or uneducated does 
not endure, nor does the compound of the two, the uneducated man. We 
speak of becoming that from this, rather than of this becoming that, with 
respect to what does not endure, as we speak of becoming educated from 
being uneducated, not from being man.1 
This distinction between the development of a subject and the de- 
velopment of a privation explains the case of my friend's stuttering. 
Where improving his stutter resulted in greater volubility, the stutter 
was the privation from which, in the annihilation of which the change 
resulted. But where the improvement resulted in an even greater 
halting and stammering, the stutter was clearly the (at least proximate) 
subject of the change. And in general, "the perfection of an imper- 
fection" will signify the attenuation or amplification of that imper- 
fection depending on whether the imperfection is the privation from 
which, or the subject of, the act of perfecting. Let us speak in the former 
case of the deprivative perfection of an imperfection, and in the latter 
of the constitutive perfection of an imperfection. 
The question of whether certain descriptions are best understood as 
referring to the privations or to the subjects of perfections is often of 
some philosophical importance. The perfection of something, under- 
stood as deprivative perfection, entails, as I have suggested, its dis- 
appearance; its perfection, therefore, lies in something other than it- 
16 Physics I, 7, 189 b 32 ff. Cf. also On Generation and Corruption I, 4, 319 b 3 ff. 
and Metaphysics Zeta, 7, 1033a5ff. Although there is an important difference 
between the material and privative terminus a quo, which Aristotle here notes 
and elsewhere expands in the simple observation that statues are brazen, not 
bronze, caskets wooden, not wood, (Metaphysics Zeta, 7, 1035a5ff., Theta, 7, 
1049al9ff.) the distinction here drawn is clearly related to that between form 
and matter. For the different senses of "of" in "the perfection or development 
of x" when x is the subject of that development and when x is the privation from 
which the development proceeds, parallel what we might call the formal and 
material "of" as in "a statue of Pericles" and "a statue of bronze." Imagine a 
piece of wood, sculpted to have molten flow, perhaps painted a bronze color, 
entitled A lloy of Copper and Tin, and exhibited; that would be a statue of bronze 
in a formal sense. A statue of Pericles in the material sense is imaginable, but 
too macabre to describe. An interesting artistic game might be the attempt to 
unite these senses; it is conceivable that someday one might encounter in a 
museum a statue of a brillo box made out of a brillo box, or see a film in which 
Fritz Lang plays Fritz Lang. 
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self. In Sylvie and Bruno, the constant improvement of maps results 
in their disappearance, for the perfect map is just the land itself: in 
color, relief, and at a scale of one mile to the mile, somewhat cumber- 
some, but terribly accurate. Is the ideal language similarly the world, 
and therefore not language? Perfect empirical knowledge not empirical 
knowledge at all? The ideal life not of this world? The perfect man not a 
man, but a god? 
These questions ultimately involve a deeper question, which is 
whether or not any and every thing can be the subject of a perfection, 
as well as the privation from which a perfection results. For they ask 
whether the criteria of perfection for some entity or class of entities 
lie elsewhere than with the entity itself. An affirmative answer to the 
deeper question suggests that each entity is to be seen as setting its 
own criteria of perfection. Such a view, or something like it, underlies 
visions of the world which tend to be aesthetic and mystical, which 
counsel a happy and benign acceptance of life, as against those which 
tend to be more moral and political. A more restricted and local version 
of such a view provides the basis for camp sensibility, for the willingess, 
i.e., to see virtually anything as a good or beautiful instance of its 
kind (even when its kind might be bad example of a larger kind). 
"It is one of the best bad movies I have ever seen," where that does not 
mean one of the least bad, is a legitimate piece of camp praise; it may 
offend us aesthetically, but we must make sense of it logically. 
The logical possibility of such views shows that it is at least super- 
ficially possible (a) to find for any description some criteria in terms 
of which it at least makes sense to say that items which fall under 
that description are good or real or perfected, and therefore (b) to 
understand "the perfection of an imperfection" in both ways I have 
suggested. At the end of this paper, I shall suggest ways in which I 
think Aristotle might have wished to modify such a claim. But subject 
to such modification, I would submit what might be called the prin- 
ciple of universal perfectability: any privation may be the subject of 
some perfection as well as the privation from which a perfection results, 
or alternatively, "the perfection of a privation" may refer to a con- 
stitutive as well as deprivative perfection. In a sense, this is only a 
version of the larger point concerning the being of non-being which is 
argued by the Stranger in the Sophist and made repeatedly by Aristotle 
throughout the Metaphysics.17 
17 For example, Sophist 237, 256ff., Metaphysics Zeta, 4, 1030a20ff. 
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One version of this principle is the following: the actuality of a 
potentiality may be constitutive as well as deprivative, for the poten- 
tiality may be the subject of the process of actualization and not the 
privation from which the actualization proceeds and which gives way 
to the resultant actuality. In such a case "the actuality of potentially 
being cp" will refer not to actually being p, but to potentially being Y. 
This fact affords us the possibility of an answer to my second 
question which will not result in the difficulties which have until now 
plagued us. We may now say: the phrase "as such" signals that it is 
the constitutive and not the deprivative actuality which is referred to 
in Aristotle's definition. Motion, in other words, is not the actuality of 
a potentiality in the sense of the actuality which results from a po- 
tentiality, but rather in the sense of an actuality which is a potentiality 
in its full manifestation. That the phrase "as such" plays this role is a 
fact for which we might have been prepared had we paid careful 
attention to the case of my friend's stuttering. For we saw there that 
one method of signalling that we were talking about the subject of a 
development was by the use of such a phrase; we talked of his im- 
proving his stutter qua stutter rather than qua speech. Similarly, to 
speak of the actuality of a potentiality qua potentiality is to signal that 
the actuality is constitutive and not deprivative. 
I think we can now attend to Aristotle's own words with greater 
understanding: 
when the buildable, in so far as we describe it as just that, is fully real 
[&vTeXePXLm], it is being built, and this is building... The actuality of 
what is potential, when it is fully real and functioning, not in this, that, or 
some other respect, but just as movable, is motion."8 
It is only when bricks and stones are being built, Aristotle is claiming, 
that they are fully manifesting their potentiality to be a house qua 
potentiality; only then that the constitutive actuality of their poten- 
tiality to be a house is realized, prior to the coming to be of the de- 
privative actuality of that potentiality, which occurs when bricks 
and stones qua buildable disappear, to be replaced by the brick and 
stone house which has been built. 
III 
But how are we to make sense of the notion of a potentiality being 
Is Physics III, 1, 201al6ff. 
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more or less manifest as a potentiality? What is the difference, in terms 
of their potentiality to be a house, between bricks and stones when they 
are lying in a pile and when they are being built? We need here, it 
seems, some concept of differing degrees of potentiality. 
Perhaps the distinctions which Aristotle draws and employs so 
fruitfully in On the Soul wiRl be helpful. Consider speaking Greek. 
Aristotle wants to argue that there are two quite distinct senses in 
which we may attribute to an entity the potentiality of speaking Greek. 
A normal Athenian infant (A) potentially speaks Greek in that he is 
capable of learning Greek and coming to speak it (and thus has the 
potentiality to speak Greek in a way that a dog, say, does not.) But 
an adult Athenian who is (not dumb but) at the moment silent (B) 
potentially speaks Greek in a different sense. Let us say that A 
potentiallyl speaks Greek, whereas B potentially2 speaks Greek. 
There is obviously yet a third possibility, that of an adult Athenian 
who at the moment is actually uttering Greek sentences in a syntacti- 
cally correct and meaningful way etc. (C). But it is clear that given C, 
we must also distinguish between two senses of "actually," the 
distinction which Aristotle exploits in his discussion of living, sensing, 
etc. For we need to be able to say that A potentially speaks Greek, 
as distinct not only from a dog, who does not potentially speak 
Greek, but from both B and C, who actually speak Greek; there must, 
however, be another sense in which B does not actually speak Greek, 
for we want to be able to distinguish him from C. So let us say that B 
actually1 speaks Greek, while C actually2 speaks Greek." 
Note that as B both potentially2 and actually, speaks Greek, so in 
general potentially2 speaking Greek and actually, speaking Greek are 
materially equivalent. This expresses somewhat awkwardly the fact 
which Aristotle would have expressed by saying that a first actuality 
is a potentiality toward a second actuality. There is therefore a sense 
in which the infant A's potentially, speaking Greek is a double 
potentiality; it is, to venture further into the labyrinth of technical 
expression, potentially potentially speaking Greek (where "speaking 
Greek" means actually2 speaking Greek), as distinct from potentially2 
speaking Greek, which is actuaUy potentially speaking Greek. More 
19 I suppose there are reasons, which it might be fruitful to explore, why it is 
natural for us to express this difference by saying that B speaks Greek and C 
is speaking Greek, whereas we should never say that B is speaking Greek, and 
ouly in special cases that C speaks Greek. 
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colloquially, we might say: C is speaking Greek, B is able to speak 
Greek, A is capable of being able to speak Greek. 
This account provides a distinction between degrees of potentiality 
and actuality of the sort which we sought. Considering it, we might be 
led to depict motion as comparable to a first actuality, intermediate as 
it is between a potentiality and the resultant product. The attractive- 
ness of such a claim may be highlighted by asking, What is the actuality 
corresponding to A's potentiality to speak Greek? Is it speaking Greek 
a la B, i.e. actually, speaking Greek or a la C i.e. actually2 speaking 
Greek? In a sense, both answers are correct, and one can imagine the 
arguments in favor of each. But although actuallyl speaking Greek is 
the proximate actuality of A's potentiality, the conceptual and onto- 
logical priority which actually2 speaking Greek enjoys, the degree to 
which the identity of actually1 speaking Greek is dependent upon it, 
should lead us to say that it is in the most serious sense the actuality 
of A's potentiality. Similarly, although Aristotle sometimes speaks 
as though in such cases there were two different potentialities with 
different actualities, such that the proper actuality of one could not 
be that of the other, he more often speaks as though there were but a 
single actuality of which both potentialities were potentialities, though 
in a different sense. Thus he sometimes describes the distinction in 
terms of being nearer to and further from some goal; the sleeping 
geometer, he says, is more distant from his actuality than the waking, 
the waking from the actually theorizing.20 At another point, the 
distinction is illustrated by the fact that we say both of a boy that he 
is potentially a general, and of an adult that he is potentially a general; 
but it would be decidedly odd to suggest that the actuality of a boy's 
potentiality to be a general is his being an adult.2' 
But B's speaking Greek is, after all, the proximate actuality of A's 
potentiality; there should be some way we can refer to it as the actuali- 
ty of a potentiality. Deep in the neological maze, we distinguished 
between A and B by saying that A only potentially potentially speaks 
Greek, whereas B actually potentially speaks Greek (where in both 
cases "speaks Greek" means actually2 speaks Greek.) Havinggone this 
far, we have little to lose by venturing one step further. Speaking 
Greek in the sense in which B speaks Greek (actually1 or potentially2 
speaking Greek) is the actuality of the potentiality to potentially 
20 Generation of Animals II, 1, 735 a 9 ff. 
"1 On the Soul II, 5, 417 b31ff. 
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speak Greek in the sense in which C speaks Greek (actually2), and this 
potentiality to potentially speak Greek, potentially. speaking Greek, 
is exhibited by A. Actually1 speaking Greek is then the deprivative 
actuality of the potentiality to potentially speak Greek, or the consti- 
tutive actuality of potentially(2) speaking Greek. We might say, to 
distinguish it from actually2 speaking Greek, that it is the actuality 
of the potentiality to speak Greek qua potentiality. 
We have thus been led by this final step into corridors of expres- 
sion which are tortuous, but at least familiar, and we should now see 
the attractiveness of comparing motion with a first actuality or 
disposition like B's speaking Greek. In both cases, we have something 
which is in one sense potential and yet in another actual, poised 
between a prior potentiality and a further actuality. When Aristotle 
introduces his discussion of motion by observing that "some things are 
only actually, some potentially, some potentially and actually,"22 
the reference is to a distinction of this sort, not to pure intelligences, 
God, prime matter, or the void. 
Furthermore, in both cases this something is the constitutive 
actuality of a potentiality, and the deprivative actuality of a double 
potentiality. Now apply these considerations to motion. When I am in 
Philadelphia, I am potentially in Berkeley. But that potentiality to 
be in Berkeley lies dormant, so to speak, until I quit Philadelphia; it 
becomes manifest, becomes, we might say, actual, only as I embark 
upon a journey to Berkeley. There is then a sense (so odd that only a 
philosopher would want to use it) in which situate in Philadelphia I 
am only potentially a potential inhabitant of Berkeley, whereas motor- 
ing through Council Bluffs on a pilgrimage from Philadelphia to Ber- 
keley, I am actually a potential inhabitant of Berkeley. And so my 
journey to Berkeley is the constitutive actuality of my potentiality 
to be in Berkeley, or of myself qua potentially in Berkeley. There is, 
to be sure, a more ordinary sense in which being in Berkeley is the 
actuality of my potentiality to be in Berkeley; but in that case, the 
potentiality is seen as privation-from-which, not as subject-of. Or 
consider again building. Bricks and stones are potentially a house, 
that is, buildable into a house. But they are manifesting this buildabi- 
lity only when they are actuaUy being built; there is therefore a (once 
again odd) sense in which bricks and stones lying about are only po- 
22 Metaphysics Kappa, 9, 1065 b5 f. These considerations suggest to me that this 
is the correct text. The version at Physics III, 1, 200b26f., may be due to 
haplography. 
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tentially buildable into a house or (odder still) are only potentially 
potentially a house. The process of being built into a house is then the 
deprivative actuality of this (double) potentiaJity; in this sense Ross 
is right,23 and it is perhaps this way of putting the matter which led 
him to suppose that this is how Aristotle put the matter. Another 
way to say that building is the deprivative actuality of the potentiality 
to be potentially a house is to say that it is the constitutive actuality 
of the bricks and stones qua potentially a house, and it is this way 
which Aristotle chooses. Motion is, he means to say, the constitutive 
actuality of what is potential as such. 
We can now understand the passage at the end of the first chapter of 
Physics III which earlier led us to think, incorrectly, that since we 
should otherwise be left with the product of the motion rather than 
with the motion itself, Aristotle must be defining motion either as a 
process, or as the actuality of a potentiality for being in motion. 
But what Aristotle says is quite simple and straightforward. The ex- 
pression "the actuality of the buildable" can mean building or the 
product of building, i.e., the house. But by the time the house is there, 
the buildable has been actualized in such a way that it is no longer 
buildable. It is, on the contrary, when the buildable is being built 
that it is most fully manifesting itself as actually buildable. Therefore 
the actuality of the buildable qua buildable, that is, the constitutive 
actuality o/ being buildable, must be the process of building. 
IV 
The attractiveness and helpfulness of comparing motion to a first 
actuality such as the dispositional ability to speak Greek are thus 
great; they must not blind us, however, to the serious and important 
differences between the concepts. To see these differences, we must 
look more closely at what Aristotle says about the distinctions we have 
explored in the last section. For the kinds of potentialities distinguished 
are more seriously different than we have made them out to be. Most 
importantly, they differ with respect to the mode in which their goal 
is achieved, the potentiality in each case translated into actuality. 
Aristotle points out that of the entities termed potential in different 
ways, 
23Above, n. 11. 
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the one is called potential because of his kind and matter, the other because 
he can [speak Greek] if he is not prevented by anything external."4 
And accordingly, he goes on to say, the transition from potentiality 
to actuality is in each case different. For the one proceeds by a change 
of quality, the other by the transition from having a quality but not 
exercising it to having the same quality fully manifest, that is, to 
exercising it: "pi~ 'vepyetv g6, E; r6 &vCpyCv."25 Let us call this latter 
mode of transition energization; it is what occurs when a wise man 
manifests his wisdom, or in general, when a skill or disposition to act 
is realized in the appropriate action. Aristotle entertains serious and 
well founded reservations about calling energization a transition at all; 
at least, he says, we must recognize that there are two quite different 
kinds of transition." 
The acquisition of a first actuality, such as learning to speak 
Greek, is a process of the former sort; its realization in the act of 
speaking Greek is an energization, a transition of the second sort. But 
although there are similarly two extremes and a middle term in the 
case of motion, the situation is importantly different. For here the 
energization takes place not between the second and third terms, but 
between the first and second. It is not, therefore, motion which is the 
most proper analogue of a first actuality, but the potentiality of which 
the motion is the (constitutive) actuality. The analogy, in other 
words, ought to be drawn in the following way: as the exercise of a 
disposition is to that disposition, for example, actually2 speaking 
Greek to actually, speaking Greek, so is motion to potentiality, e.g., 
the motion in (by) which bricks and stones are built into a house to 
the potentiality for being a house which those bricks and stones have 
when they are not being built, and so is the movable in motion to the 
movable at rest. 
It is for this reason among others, that there is, as I claimed earlier, 
no motion by which motion comes into being, nor, what is the same 
thing, by which a potentiality comes to be realized as a potentiality. 
There may be a motion by which an object acquires a potentiality, 
but once the potentiality has been acquired, only an act of energization 
24 On the Soul II, 5, 417 a 26 ff. Aristotle's actual example is the exercise of know- 
ledge. 
26 Ibid., 417b6f. 
26 Ibid.,417 b 6ff. 
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is needed for motion to begin. And there are, Aristotle believes, 
powerful arguments which show that this must be the case.27 
It is not, of course, the buildable which by its own agency manifests 
its buildability; but then many dispositions are not wholly within the 
power of their subjects.28 The buildable is brought to the full realization 
of its buildability, that is, to the constitutive actuality of its poten- 
tiality to be a house, only by the agency of the builder, as he in turn 
exercises his power to build, makes actual his skill in the act of building. 
These actualities, as Aristotle repeatedly points out, are different only 
in definition; moving and being moved, acting and being acted upon 
are one and the same actuality, differing only as the way from Athens 
to Thebes differs from the way from Thebes to Athens.29 It is only to 
be expected then that building, like being built, is in one sense an 
actuality, though in another a motion. It must not surprise us to find 
Aristotle cautioning that it would be 
wrong to say that the thinker in thinking undergoes a change, just as it 
would be wrong to say this of the builder when he builds,ao 
while at other times, building is clearly classified as a motion. Building 
and being built are indeed motions (one and the same motion), but 
each is at the same time the exercise of a dispositional first actuality, 
in the one case that of being buildable, in the other that of being a 
builder. 
V 
Motion, then, is the functioning, the full manifesting of a potentiality 
qua potentiality, or more precisely, the functioning of a being which is 
potential as that potential being. It should now be clear why Aristotle 
says that "motion is a kind of vgpy?oc, but incomplete [CXT?e]." 
The reason for this, he goes on to say, "is that the potential of which 
it is the t'VpyELO iS incomplete."3l This clearly cannot mean that there 
is some special kind of incomplete potentiality, the actuality of which 
is incomplete and is motion. For all potentiality is ar?A, incomplete or 
27 Such as are explored throughout Books V and VI of the Physics. 
28 Sensation is a notable instance; cf. On the Soul II, 5, 417 b 19ff. 
29 Physics III, 3, 202alOff.; On the Soul III, 2, 425b26ff. Cf. above, n. 3. 
30 On the Soul II, 5, 417 b8f. My italics, of course. 
31 Physics III, 2, 201 b31 f.; Metaphysics Kappa, 9, 1066a20f. Cf. also Physics 
VIII, 5, 257b9 and Metaphysics Theta, 6, 1048b29. 
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unperfected. The point is rather that motion is the constitutive actu- 
ality of an entity which is by definition incomplete, and since the 
constitutive actuality of an entity is simply that entity in its full 
manifestation, motion itself is an incomplete actuality. 
But in that case, what will count as a complete evepyeLc? If the 
relation of motion to potentiality is that of evepye to disposition, 
and if a disposition is itself a kind of potentiality, then why isn't 
any evepye, as the actuality of a dispositional potentiality, incomplete? 
In the case of motion, the actuality, because it is the actuality of 
a potentiality toward some other entity, remains incompleted even in 
its actuality. But in the case of kvepyeta proper, the actuality has no 
other end than itself. Consequently, in being actualized qua potentiality, 
it is at one and the same time actualized qua the actuality which 
that potentiality is a potentiality toward. There is, in other words, 
an entity in the case of motion which is intermediate, namely the 
motion itself. But in the case of what I have called energization, what 
is analogous to the motion is one and the same entity as what is 
analogous to the resultant state toward which the motion is directed. 
There is therefore, no distinction between actuality qua potential and 
qua the actuality of that potential. 
This fact may be put in terms of our earlier discussion: in all cases 
of energization, the resultant actuality is constitutive, never depri- 
vative. In cases of motion, however, the ultimate actuality is de- 
privative, although there is an intermediate constitutive actuality. 
This is essentially how Aristotle characterizes the two modes of 
transition when he says that "the one, which is a change of qualities, 
is with respect to privation, the other is with respect to dispositional 
qualities [9iaq] and nature."32 
The sense in which motion is incomplete, then, is the sense in which 
it is &-reXn in the literal sense, i.e. in which it does not contain its 
own end, but is directed toward an end outside itself. Putting the 
matter this way suggests but does not fully bring out the self-de- 
structive (and what might be called, even at the risk of extravagance, 
tragic) dimension of motion. For motion is the actuality of a poten- 
tiality which is aimed ultimately at an actuality other than the motion 
and fatal to it. Motion does not, therefore, just happen to cease, its 
essential activity is devoted to ceasing. Its being is auto-subversive, 
for its whole purpose and project is one of self-annihilation. 
32 On the Soul II, 5, 417bl4ff. 
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The essential self-destructive character of motion brings out what 
is ultimately wrong with comparing motion to a first actuality dis- 
position. For while motion is aimed at a fulfillment which lies outside 
itself and brings about its destruction, the fulfillment of a disposition 
preserves and often enriches it. The completion of a house, towards 
which the process of building the house is aimed, brings an end to that 
process, whereas it would be more than just absurd to claim that one 
cannot speak Greek while he is speaking Greek. It would be exactly 
contrary to the truth; speaking Greek is just the full manifestation of 
the ability to speak Greek. To say that a man speaks Greek is to predict 
that on some occasions he will blossom forth in Greek sentences; but 
this is very different from the fact that to say that a house is being 
built is to predict that on some occasion there will be a house. For the 
existence of the house is proof that it was, but is no longer, being built, 
whereas the uttering of Greek sentences is proof that the man does, 
and under normal circumstances will in the future, speak Greek. 
VI 
It is this feature which similarly provides the ground of distinction 
between motion and Ev6pyemL proper. Aristotle distinguishes between 
actions, like the removing of fat, or walking from one place to another, 
or building, which are not an end, but are relative to an end, and 
actions like seeing, living well, walking in the sense of strolling (spa- 
zieren) which are their own end, and are thus not limited by the 
necessity of having to cease in order that they may not be frustrated. 
Of the latter, he says, in a famous sentence: 
At one and the same time we are seeing and have seen, are understanding 
and have understood, are thinking and have thought, while it is not true 
that at the same time we are learning and have learnt, or are being cured 
and have been cured.33 
No reference is here being made to any temporal point such as that 
presently seeing entails having seen at some time in the past, nor to 
the possibility of combining present and past tenses. To detach having 
seen and consider it in any relation whatsoever to seeing is to miss 
precisely Aristotle's point, which is an explication of the earlier funda- 
mental point. For he goes on to say: 
33 Metaphysics Theta, 6, 1048 b 23 ff. 
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In some cases the ultimate thing is the exercise; as in sight, the ultimate 
thing is seeing, and no other product results from sight.34 
There is nothing which lies outside seeing which can be identified with 
having seen as the house which is the result of building can be identified 
with having (been) built. The end of building is having (been) built, 
but the end of seeing is not having seen; it is seeing. And in general, 
the end of a motion is having moved, but of an rv?pycx, the evcpye v, 
the acting itself. Seeing and the completion of seeing happen together, 
for they are one and the same thing. It is not that an eivpysr.OC can go on 
forever, whereas motion must cease; it is rather than an ?vepJyELO is 
eternal, for its full actuality and realization is present in every instance 
of its occurrence.35 
This issue demands considerably more discussion than I have given 
it, but I hope that the central point is clear and correct. Another 
issue is raised by that point, about which I shall also make only (what 
I hope will be provocative) suggestions. If motion is a degenerate 
kind of ?v?pyLoc, it is not clear why Aristotle should have thought it 
an (even putative) paradigm of 'vcpyrc. It is clear that he did; a 
serious question for first philosophy, included in the list of aporiai 
in Metaphysics Beta, is whether or not there is a distinction between 
actuality and potentiality other than with reference to motion,36 and 
the answer to this question later in the Metaphysics, an answer, to be 
sure, in the affirmative, is prefaced by the remark that "actuality is 
thought to be above all motion."37 
The reason for this emerges if we remember that v6pySLcx is a kind 
of acting; the temptation for the Greeks to put true reality with 
movement was much greater than the temptation to put it with rest.38 
Actuality is de-motionalized being not by virtue of having been brought 
to quiescence, but by virtue of having become entelic, having become 
its own end. 
It is for this reason that circular motion, of which each part is as 
34 Metaphysics Theta, 8, 1050a23ff. My reading of this passage is somewhat 
tendencious, but not unfair. Literally the passage expresses the view that with 
regard to some faculties, their actual use (XpML4) is the only end or purpose 
(1Xacx,ro) of their being; there is no product toward which that exercise is in 
turn directed. But this is substantially the same point as I have been stressing. 
35 See the discussion of pleasure, Nichomachean Ethics X, 4, 1174al3ff. 
36 Metaphysics Beta, 1, 996a 10ff. 
"7 Metaphysics Theta, 3, 1047a33ff. 
38 Witness the exchange between Theaetetus and the Stranger at Sophist 249a. 
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much the end as any other, is the closest analogue to full reality.39 
In one sense that reality is most closely approximated in the axis of 
such motion, in the still point at the center of the most energetic 
activity. The immovable peg of the furiously spinning top in Book IV 
of the Republic40 is an e2w)Aov, a type of the calm and ordered soul at 
the center of the politically active man who is the hero of that dialogue. 
This vision of ceaseless activity with a calm center is to be found 
earlier in the shining, singing axles of the chariot which takes Parme- 
nides to the place of his revelation, a revelation which in turn is of 
the "unmoving heart of well-rounded truth."'41 
The center as focal point holds together that which is moving, 
prevents it from disintegrating, and thus preserves its integrity and 
self-identity; but it does so only in symbiotic union with the limiting 
and bounding force of the periphery. And so in another sense it is 
equally the circumference which, in establishing limit and in its very 
steadiness of circuit and ever-regenerated newness, resembles that 
reality. Aristotle's unmoved mover, as much at the circumference as at 
the center of the cosmos, descends from that more ancient god, the 
great encircling Okeanos, forever flowing and nourishing, yet un- 
changed.42 
Like Parmenides, Aristotle finds at the heart of all being that 
which is unmoved, but not inactive. At the heart of the cosmos is that 
which is full act, total shining forth of being. Substance, that is, o'uaL 
or be-ing, is an activity, an entity's manifesting what it is; to be a man 
is to shine forth with humanity, to act one's manhood out in the 
world. Aristotle thus says that of things which are actual, some are 
"as motion to potentiality, others as oi)aooc to some matter."43 Beings 
therefore imitate divinity in being, acting out, what they are; imitatio 
dei consists in striving not to be God, but to be one's self, to emulate 
that being who is totally active, i.e., who totally is what he is. 
That the essence of God is actuality44 has other than metaphysical 
force for Aristotle. For we partake of divinity in our capacity for 
action which is actuality and which has no limit and no end outside it- 
self. The possibility of such action frees us from the tyranny of motion, 
39Physics VIII, 9, 265a33ff.; On the Heavens I, 9, 279b1ff. 
40 Republic 436d. 
,1 Parmenides, Fragment I, lines 6, 29. 
4' Physics VIII, 10; Iliad XXI, 194. 
43 Metaphysics Theta, 6, 1048 b 8 f. 
44 Metaphysics Lambda, 6, 1071 b20. 
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which is necessarily self-destructive, and at the same time rescues 
motion from the vanity of infinite regress, by providing the ends 
which must necessarily lie outside motion itself. 
Personal tragedies result when motion and 'v&pyeLo are confused, 
either by a man coming to define his being in terms of motion, or by 
his taking the necessary motions of his life to be &v6pyso. In the one 
case, he must work simultaneously to sustain and destroy his being; 
the fulfillment of his desires is the destruction of the self which is 
defined by those desires. This is a tragedy which is every day made 
easier for us; for we live in a society in which is celebrated not doing, 
but having done. Speed reading advertisements teach us to prize not 
the reading of a book, but the having read it; we value not studying 
but learning, not working but earning, ultimately not living but having 
lived. Thus all our actions come to be directed towards ends outside 
themselves; our life becomes one long motion, which can never be 
fulfilled. 
Where ends become means, there is danger, as in the other case, that 
what are really means will be taken for ends, and prevented from achiev- 
ing the fulfillment towards which they are aimed. So intentional pro- 
cesses become alienated from the goals which alone make sense of 
them; bureaucracy replaces service, image becomes imaged, the 
medium, which was never meant to be the message (though never 
meant to be distinct from it) becomes a new message of its own. 
With Aristotle, we must learn to ask what in our lives can and cannot 
be evEpyeLaL. How do we turn our actions in upon themselves so that 
they become their own ends, but in such a way that ends do not dis- 
appear, nor that we turn wholly into ourselves? We are to become at 
once like Plato's sun, shining for itself with its light, but illuminating 
and nourishing in the process, and like Parmenides' moon, "wandering 
around the earth, shining forth in the night with a borrowed light."'5 
Nor is this task distinct from that of living the good life, the life worthy 
of being its own end. 
The qualifications which Aristotle would have placed on the prin- 
ciple of universal perfectability I earlier introduced should by now 
have emerged. In one sense, anything can indeed be the subject of 
perfection; but just as motion is doomed to annihilation, so some 
perfections are inherently aimed at further perfections outside them- 
selves, and without these further perfections - genuine ends - would 
*6 Parmenides, Fragment XIV. 
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never be capable of achievement at all.46 This fact is an analogue of 
logical and metaphysical doctrines of Aristotle. Although in a sense 
anything can be a subject of predication, only substances are proper 
subjects, and without them, there could be no predication; the being 
of qualities, quantities, relations, etc., though incapable of being 
denied, must be recognized as dependent upon the being of substances. 
But the nature of the good life, the life of evcpyxc, is, as Aristotle 
reveals in the Nichomachean Ethics,47 dependent upon our nature 
as men. This reveals that there is a plurality of such ends worthy in 
themselves, and that the question of what these ends are (like the 
question of what logical subjects are) is ultimately associated with 
questions of what species and substances are. This fact echoes the 
claim I made about Aristotle's vision of imitatio dei; here once more the 
answers to logical, metaphysical and ethical questions have their 
common origin in his view of individual substances acting out their 
identity in the world. 
Haverford College 
46 Nichomachean Ethics I, 1, 2, 1094 a 1ff. 
'4 Nichomachean Ethics I, 7, 1097 b 23 ff. 
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